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Why are online community sizes so extremely unequal? Most answers to this question have pointed to
general mathematical processes drawn from physics like cumulative advantage. ese explanations provide
lile insight into specic social dynamics or decisions that individuals make when joining and leaving
communities. In addition, explanations in terms of cumulative advantage do not draw from the enormous
body of social computing research that studies individual behavior. Our work bridges this divide by testing
whether two inuential social mechanisms used to explain community joining can also explain the distribution
of community sizes. Using agent-based simulations, we evaluate how well individual-level processes of social
exposure and decisions based on individual expected benets reproduce empirical community size data from
Reddit. Our simulations contribute to social computing theory by providing evidence that both processes
together—but neither alone—generate realistic distributions of community sizes. Our results also illustrate
the potential value of agent-based simulation to online community researchers to both evaluate and bridge
individual and group-level theories.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Massive inequality in membership size is a feature of virtually every platform hosting online
communities. A few very large communities aract the vast majority of contributors while most
communities receive almost none. is paern occurs in peer production communities like open
source soware and wikis as well as discussion-oriented communities like forums. For example, in
January 2017 the “r/AskReddit” community on Reddit had over 680,000 unique contributors who
made over 5.3 million comments. e next most active community on Reddit, “r/politics” had around
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156,000 contributors and 2.2 million comments. Meanwhile, the median number of contributors to
a Reddit community that month was three and the median number of total comments was ve.1
Why are some online communities so much larger than others? Why do people join online
communities? Most prior answers to the rst question in social computing research treat group size
as the result of mathematical mechanisms drawn from physics such as cumulative advantage or
preferential aachment. ese approaches minimize agency and lack a clear link to individual-level
behavior. e body of work answering the second question has provided explanations of how
people make these individual decisions but only in the context of a single community. Social
computing research suggests three sequential subprocesses that inuence individual decisions to
join or leave communities. In the rst step, people learn about communities through social ties
and social inuence. We call this social exposure. In a second step following exposure, people
decide whether to participate for the rst time or not (i.e., to join a community). Finally, aer a
period of activity, people decide to discontinue their participation. Prior work treats joining and
exit decisions as a function of individuals’ motivations, abilities, and/or expectations that a given
community will satisfy their goals in some way. We refer to this approach to joining and exit
decisions as individual expected benets (IEB).
ese individual-level explanations typically do not aempt to explain macro-level phenomena
like the distribution of participants across communities. Logically, group sizes must emerge as a
function of individual decisions about which groups to join. But how well do individual joining
processes explain macro outcomes like membership size? Understanding higher-level implications
of individual-level behaviors is oen dicult. In social systems like online communities, individual
behaviors are interdependent and combine to produce macro-level paerns in complicated ways
that are hard to predict. is “micro-macro divide” makes it very dicult to directly test ndings
across levels.
One approach to bridging this divide is agent-based simulation (or ABS, also known as agent-
based modeling). ABS involves building empirically-informed formal approximations of theories of
individual behavior, using computers to step through simulated interactions between individual
agents behaving according to the formalized theories, and comparing the macro-level outcomes of
these simulations against empirically-observed data.
To bridge the micro-macro divide in online community research, we formalize models of theories
of social exposure and IEB decisions and use ABS to simulate computational agents acting according
to these models across a range of simulated situations. We also simulate a novel joint model of
social exposure and IEB. We evaluate our models and the underlying theories by assessing how
well agents reproduce the paerns of community size observed empirically in Reddit. We nd that
simulated agents acting according either social exposure or IEB alone do not produce empirically
plausible community size distributions. In contrast, when the two sub-processes of exposure
and IEB decisions act in tandem, sucient positive feedback emerges to produce highly skewed
distributions similar to that of Reddit.
is paper makes three primary contributions. First, we provide a framework for connecting
micro-level social computing research inuenced by social psychology with macro-level research on
organizational behavior and group and population dynamics. In doing so, we show how higher-level
paerns can enrich our understanding of individual behavior, and vice versa. Second, we provide
arguments and evidence for the usefulness of agent-based simulation in social computing research.
Finally, we provide a theoretical synthesis between social exposure and IEB decisions and show
that both together provide a good explanation for the extreme inequality in online community
sizes.
1All data from Reddit (hps://reddit.com) used in this paper was gathered and republished by Pushshi (hps://pushshi.io).
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2 BACKGROUND
Social computing research on community participation and community growth is divided into two
largely distinct bodies of micro- and macro-level scholarship. To motivate our use of agent-based
simulation as a bridge between the two levels, we briey review salient examples of each. First, we
consider micro-level explanations of community membership that focus on two sub-processes: how
people learn about communities through social exposure and how they decide to join or leave them
based on expected benets. We then discuss prior explanations of community size distributions
from a macro-level perspective, underscoring that such explanations typically have lile to say
about individual-level behaviors. Next, we introduce ABS as a method for evaluating the impact
of micro-level community joining behavior on the macro-level distribution of community sizes.
Finally, we discuss how micro-level processes may contribute to macro-level behavioral outcomes
and why macro-level consequences maer for micro-level models.
2.1 Explaining individual-level community joining and exit
2.1.1 Social exposure. While people may learn about new communities in multiple ways, expo-
sure oen occurs through social ties [31]. Social exposure-based explanations of online community
joining are one example of how social ties predict the adoption of computing behaviors. For
example, the more friends who adopt a technology product [10], paerns of behavior [6, 45], or
shared information [7], the more likely a focal person is to do the same. A few studies have looked
explicitly at the decision to join online groups and have found the same dynamics: the more friends
a person has in a group, the more likely they are to join it [5, 27]. Social exposure to new online
communities is a common feature of participation on the Internet and users of online communities
are frequently being exposed to new communities. For example, in January 2017, 792,643 comments
on Reddit—over 1% of all public comments made on Reddit that month—included links to other
Reddit communities.
2.1.2 Decisions based on individual expected benefits. Once exposed to a set of communities,
people join online communities in order to advance their goals and to meet their needs [29, 41].
Individuals decide whether and how to participate in a community based on their personal aributes,
motivations, and experiences. Potential members reason prospectively about the community and
whether they can imagine themselves as a part of it [2–4]. Over time, individuals will remain or leave
depending on how existing members respond to them (e.g., do they bite the newbies or reach out
to oer support?) or based on shiing perceptions of the community, other members, or their own
role [12, 22, 23, 35, 37]. As part of these decisions, people may estimate the impact and importance
of their contributions. For example, when the government of the People’s Republic of China
eliminated access to Wikipedia for their citizens, thereby decreasing the editor community and
audience of Chinese Wikipedia, Chinese-speaking Wikipedians from the rest of world dramatically
reduced their participation [50]. All else equal, larger communities with larger audiences tend
to aract more participants. Aer joining a group, some people deepen their commitment to it
and develop aachments in the form of identity and/or social bonds [31]. e extent to which a
person has these aachments also inuences whether they continue to participate or leave [17, 27].
Eventually, individual community members reach a peak of participation and exit a community
when it no longer helps to meet their goals.
To summarize this prior work in a schematic way, people decide to join and participate in
online communities as long as they expect that the benets they receive outweigh the costs of
participating. We use the term individual expected benets (IEB) to describe this way of thinking
about joining decisions. e IEB approach is illustrated in the nal chapter of the book Building
Successful Online Communities [31], wherein Resnick et al. [41] provide an equation-based model
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intended to summarize how people weigh costs and benets when deciding whether to join an
online community. Like the rest of the book, the model is presented as part of extensive literature
review and aempts to integrate and summarize a rich body of work on the topic of community
joining and exit decisions in social computing theory.
In Resnick et al.’s model, benets fall into two categories: participation benets and early adopter
benets. Participation benets are a function of the eventual size of the community and might
include social relationships, entertainment, and information. Early adopter benets are benets
which only accrue to early members and include inuence, reputation, or even revenue sharing. e
costs to join a community (which they call “startup costs”) include learning new soware, learning
the norms of a new community, and building reputation and social ties. If someone believes that
the expected utility of the participation benets plus the early adopter benets outweigh the costs
then they will join that community or continue to participate. If not, they leave the community or
never participate in the rst place.
2.2 Explaining inequality in online community size
Although distributions of community size emerge as a consequence of individuals joining and
leaving communities, prior work has analyzed these distributions without making serious eorts
to explain their relationship to individual-level behaviors. One clear takeaway from studies of
community size across a range of platforms and contexts is that distributions of community sizes
are highly skewed [25]. For example, in one month on the platform Reddit, twelve subreddits (i.e.,
topic-based communities) had over 100,000 unique contributors, while over 44,000 subreddits had
fewer than ve contributors (Figure 1). Free/open source soware communities [15, 20, 24], wikis
and other peer production production projects [9], online discussion forums [26, 38], and many
other platforms follow similar paerns.
Whether identied as following a scale-free “power law” [1, 8], “weakly” scale-free, or merely log-
normal [11] distributions, explanations of community size typically invoke cumulative advantage
and/or preferential aachment [8, 34]. In these models, current community size is the only variable
used to predict future community size. In short, popular communities become ever more popular.
Drawing from models used in physics, these explanations emphasize mathematics of accumulation
without providing credible social mechanisms of individual action that might act as reasonable
approximations of the mathematics. Sociologists have referred to these types of explanations as
“undersocialized” accounts [e.g., 19].
Could models of social exposure and IEB act as social mechanisms which reproduce the broader
dynamics of cumulative advantage or preferential aachment, and thus explain higher-level paerns
of inequality in community sizes based on empirically-grounded, individual-level research? In
that social computing scholars studying joining processes have focused on individual-level and
group-level outcomes, they have not aempted to understand paerns in populations of groups.
As a result, we simply do not know.
Of course, researchers have considered why groups grow or founder. Most of this prior work
also focuses on just one level. For example, some studies explain variation in group outcomes
based on group-level behavior. In this work communities appear as independent entities and
features of members, their interactions, or institutions predict outcomes like size or longevity
[14, 16, 28, 30, 44]. Although valuable, this work tells us lile about the distribution of community
sizes because group membership is presumed and dierences in outcomes arise from things that
happen within communities.
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Fig. 1. Distribution of members per subreddit in January 2017. The x-axis is the number of users with at least
five comments in that subreddit in the month. The y-axis is the count of communities with that number of
users. Both axes are log-scaled.
Other studies analyze relationships between groups—e.g., whether overlaps in group membership
predict group survival or growth [46, 48, 51, 52]. Again, this research explains variation between
community outcomes and does not account for the overall distributions of community size.
2.3 Agent-based simulation
In short, previous research provides lile insight into how well individual behavioral models of
joining and exit explain inequality in online community sizes. One explanation for this gap in
our understanding is the challenges of drawing inferences across levels of theorizing and analysis.
It is dicult to test competing theories of joining and community size simultaneously because
doing so requires studying individual-level processes across many organizations and communities.
is poses a barrier to research because many challenges involved in conducting empirical social
computing research scale with the number of communities and contexts involved. For example,
issues of access to data on users and their motivation, challenges related to both the size and
diversity of data, and nuts-and-bolts issues related to the navigation of idiosyncratic features of
multiple communities make it challenging enough for researchers to study detailed user-level
behavior within a single community. Doing it across thousands or even millions of communities is
oen simply not possible.
Prior work in the social sciences describes this type of challenge in terms of a “micro-macro
divide” [36]. To address these challenges, researchers in ecology, economics, and sociology have
characterized “agent-based complex systems” [21] where properties of larger systems emerge from
the decisions of interdependent agents. ese disciplines oen employ agent-based simulations in
order to bridge the micro-macro divide [21, 49]. Agent-based simulations (ABSs) capture important
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aspects of a context in the form of simple rules that agents follow. Researches then create virtual
experiments by modifying these rules in order to identify the conditions under which interacting
agents produce various higher-level outcomes [32]. At their best, such models reveal paerns
of emergent collective behavior that even thoughtful analysis of micro-level action might never
predict (and vice-versa). In one of the earliest agent-based simulations, Schelling [43] showed how
a world in which agents hold even a very weak preference to live near someone who resembles
them becomes completely segregated—without any reference to geography, jobs, moving costs,
social networks, and almost everything that real people seem to consider in deciding to move.
eories like critical mass theory [33] and complex contagion [13] were developed with the help
of agent-based simulations and have been inuential in social computing research [39, 42]. Despite
this history of beneting from ABS, a strong t with social computing research questions, and calls
for use from prominent scholars [40], agent-based simulations remain extremely rare in HCI and
social computing.
Because they bypass many of the challenges with large-scale empirical research described
above, ABSs oer a feasible approach to bridge theories and ndings at dierent levels of analysis.
ey can allow theory and data at higher levels to inuence micro-level mechanisms and provide
grounded, validated explanations for macro-level paerns. ABSs also let us explore how variation
in assumptions and models of individual behavior combine and aggregate to group and population
dynamics and can thus help enrich theories of individual and group behavior.
2.4 Bridging the “micro-macro divide” between joining/exit and community size
An ABS approach allows us to explore the community size distributions that emerge when agents
join and leave communities according to models of social exposure and/or IEB decisions. is
approach helps to formalize questions and theories, test how changes to assumptions and parameters
inuence outcomes, and evaluate the simulated outcomes against empirical baselines.
Consider the implications of social exposure dynamics on community size distributions. Social
exposure provides a plausible micro-level mechanism of cumulative advantage. In that larger
communities have more members by denition, they also have more people who can talk about
them. is could lead to more people learning about and joining larger communities than smaller
ones. is would result in even more people talking about the larger communities in the future.
e result is a positive feedback mechanism where success begets success [47].
Joining decisions based on IEB could also contribute to skewed outcomes. If individuals take
participation benets and early-adopter benets as described by Resnick et al. [41] into account as
they decide which communities to join, they will gravitate towards those that are already large or
that appear positioned to become largest. is should also create a feedback loop, where individuals
join quickly growing communities, causing others to be even more likely to see them as quickly
growing. As with social exposure, these dynamics could produce skewed group sizes.
Together, the positive feedback paerns created by social exposure and IEB decisions should
amplify each other. With both forces operating jointly, people are both more likely to be exposed
to larger communities as well as more likely to join them. Subsequently, these new members will
expose others to these larger communities, who will also be more likely to join them, and so on.
We would expect this to result in even more skewed distributions of community size than either
model operating alone.
3 METHODS
We created a set of agent-based simulations to explore whether computational models of social
exposure and/or IEB decisions generate distributions of community size that resemble those
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observed empirically. To do so, we formalized theories of social exposure and IEB decisions into
algorithms that simulated agents that decide which communities to join or leave and which to
share with others. For each of the micro-level mechanisms, we simulated a series of decisions and
interactions among a population of agents over time to observe the macro-level consequences in a
population of hypothetical communities. We show the results of these simulations and compare
the distribution of hypothetical community sizes to a sample drawn from Reddit. Additional details
about the general approach, how we generated each set of simulations, and the process we follow
for comparing the simulated results against the empirical baseline appear below.
3.1 Simulated models of community joining and exit
We performed four families of simulations. First, a set of null models with agents joining and
leaving communities randomly to provide a starting point for comparison. We then ran models
which test the inuence of social exposure and IEB decisions separately. Finally, we simulated a
model that includes both social exposure and IEB decisions.
For each of the four sets of simulations, we parameterize key conceptual variables involved
in community joining and exit and run each simulation with slightly varied parameter values.
Doing so serves several purposes. First, the varied parameters help ensure that the results from a
set of simulations represent a general, meaningful paern rather than an artifact of any specic
parameter. is is especially important because many of the parameter values are choices informed
by prior research rather than precise empirical estimates. Second, by observing the results over a
range of plausible values, we can evaluate variation in outcomes over dierent realizations of the
theories we test. Finally, this approach reduces the risk that our ndings reect ukes that only
appear in a limited set of conditions.
All of the models are intended to simulate populations of people and communities over time.
Each simulation proceeds through a series of steps. In each time step, each agent sees a subset
of communities (the exposure set). Agents then decide whether to leave any of their current
communities and whether to join any of the communities in the exposure set. Our model stores the
results of these decisions and then moves to the next agent until all agents have completed their
decisions. e process iterates repeatedly over a series of time steps until we declare a stopping
point.
We x the size of each of our simulations to 9,000 agents and 200 communities. We use 9,000
agents because it is few enough to be computationally tractable but large enough to allow for
complex dynamics to emerge. We chose 200 communities because this sets the ratio of members and
communities close to what is observed empirically on Reddit. In January 2017, there were 3,578,907
active commenters on Reddit who commented in 78,201 subreddits, a ratio of approximately 90:2.
We run each simulation for 24 time steps in order to allow the community size distributions to
reach a steady state. Finally, we measure the number of members per community.
3.1.1 Null models. We rst simulate a null model, in which exposure and participation are
random. e null model does the following during each simulated time step: Each agent randomly
leaves any community they currently belong to with probability pl . Each agent draws a random
sample from the pool of all communities with with probability pe , and each agent randomly chooses
to join each sampled community with probability pj .
We can observe how oen people leave online communities, and so we set a value for pl based on
the proportion of people who leave subreddits each month on reddit. Of all user accounts leaving
at least 5 comments in any given subreddit in January 2017, 56% did not comment at least ve times
in that same subreddit in February. As a result, we set pl to .56. Exposure is less visible. People are
exposed to new online communities but we don’t know how many or which ones. Neither can we
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estimate the probability of participating aer exposure. Because we assume that both are fairly
low, we vary pe and pj over levels of {.01, .05, .1, .2} for our null simulations.
3.1.2 Social exposure models. eories of social exposure suggest that people learn about new
communities through people they are already connected to. Our social exposure models capture
this dynamic by randomly sampling k community members from each of the focal agent’s n
communities. Larger communities have more people and therefore more opportunities for social
connections, so we set ki = ceil(loд(|ni | + 1)) where |ni | is the current size of the ith community
and ki is the number of “neighbors” sampled from that community. e ceil function rounds up to
the nearest integer, ensuring that we always sample at least one neighboring agent.
During each time step, each of these k neighboring community members samples up to m of
their other communities to share with the focal agent. We vary m from 1 to 4 across dierent
simulations. is process denes an exposure set for each agent of maximum size n ∗ k ∗m. e
size of the exposure set can be smaller if the chosen fellow members belong to fewer thanm other
communities or if they share a community already in the exposure set. An agent not yet belonging
to any communities is exposed to a random sample of all of communities with uniform probability
pe = .1. Because social exposure theories have nothing to say about community exit, agents exit
communities randomly with probability pl = .56 as in our null models. From our null models, we
found that choices for pe and pj were of lile importance to the qualitative distributional properties
of interest. As a result, we x pe = pj = .1 and include models where pe = pj = .05 in the appendix
as robustness checks.
No research that we know of provides insight into which communities people are likely to share
with others. We show one model designed to capture this ignorance in which agents simply choose
randomly which communities to share. However, one argument of this paper is that individual-level
theories can and should be informed by higher-level phenomena. If we consider the skew toward
membership in large communities observed empirically, we might guess that agents are more likely
to share large communities. We therefore also simulate a social exposure model where agents share
the largest communities to which they belong.
3.1.3 IEB decision models. In order to formalize and simulate individual expected benets
theories, we begin with the formal IEB model by Resnick et al. [41]. Resnick et al. formalize their
logic in equations but but do not elaborate rules with enough detail to dene behavior for the
computational agents in our simulation. As a result, we rst need to translate general concepts
from the Resnick et al. model into rules specic enough for agents to follow.
Following Resnick et al., we model participation decisions as a function of community size and
anticipated future growth. For any agent, the expected benet of joining a community equals
participation benets (BP ) plus early adopter benets (BEA) minus startup costs (CS ). Resnick et al.
treated community success as dichotomous, claiming that people benet from participation in
communities that “succeed” by growing to a certain (undened) size but not from participation in
those that “fail.” We extend their approach by using a continuous representation of participation
benets. e intuition behind doing so is that a community with 1,000 people has more information,
opportunities for friendship, and so on, than a community with 100 people, but that the smaller
community provides some benets. Support for this choice comes from recent survey work that
suggests that small communities provide value to their members [18]. We expect benets of size to
scale sublinearly so that a community with 1,000 people is not 10 times more valuable than one
with 100. Agents therefore calculate participation benets (Bp ) as a logarithmic function of their
estimate of the future size (Sf ) of a community:
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BP = loд(SF + 1)
In the rst set of IEB models, we assume that agents estimate future community size (SF ) by
observing the current size and age of the community and making linear extrapolations with slope
SC
age six time steps into the future:
SF = SC + 6
SC
age
In this way, early adopter benets are a function of both the current size of the community, in
that joiners of small communities have more opportunities for inuence and status, and of the
estimated future size (SF ), because inuence and status are more valuable in larger communities.
As with benets from community success, the Resnick et al. model treats early adopter benets
as dichotomous. In this approach, a subset of early adopters benet if a community succeeds, while
no one else does. As with participation benets, it makes more sense to model early adopter benets
as continuous so that they increase with the eventual size of the community, but decrease with
the size of a community when an agent begins participating. Specically, agents calculate early
adopter benets (BEA) as the ratio of the natural logarithm of the their estimate of the community’s
future size (SF ) and the natural logarithm of the current size if they join (SC + 1). To avoid numeric
issues, we add 1 to SF and 2 SC :
BEA =
loд(SF + 1)
loд(SC + 2)
Treating benets as a continuous function makes it possible for an agent to choose the top ranked
of the possible communities to join.
Finally, for the sake of parsimony, we assume that startup costs (Cs ) are xed and identical
across communities, but only apply to communities an agent does not already belong to. e total
individual expected benets for some agent i for a given community (denoted with the subscript j)
is therefore:
Bi j = BPi j + BEAi j − 1i<jCS
Where BP ij is the agent’s estimate of the participation benets for community j, BEAi j is agent i’s
estimate of early adopter benets for j, and 1i<j indicates when i does not already belong to j (and
thus has to pay the startup cost to join).
Our formalization of the IEB theory captures the main ideas of the Resnick et al. model and
makes more realistic assumptions in several respects. Figure 2 uses the total expected benets
function to visualize expected benets over a range of values for the community size when an
agent joins it (increasing along the x-axis) and the predicted community size (increasing along the
y-axis). e greatest expected benets occur in the top-le of the gure representing communities
when they are predicted to grow large and when the agent has the opportunity to join early.
As our simulations proceed, agents also make decisions about whether to stay in communities or
exit. More formally, an agent may join or exit a set of communities comprised of the union of their
current communities and the exposure set in each time step. e agent participates in the proportion
pk of these communities with the highest expected benets (Bi ). We know from empirical research
that participation is rare, but we don’t know how rare. We therefore run simulations across the set
of pk values {.05, .1, .2}.
As with the social exposure models, we also simulate alternative specications of the IEB models.
Profound skew in community size suggests that people may value community size more highly than
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Fig. 2. Visualization of total expected benefits in our formalized IEB process. The x-axis shows the current
size (SC ) of the community when the agent considers joining and the y-axis represents the agent’s prediction
for how large the community will grow six time steps in the future (SF )
linear model terms can accommodate. To address this, we also simulate agents who extrapolate
from the current community size using a quadratic function. is increases the predicted size of
already large communities by much more than it increases the predicted size of small communities
and further reinforces the strong preference for larger communities.
3.1.4 Combined models. Finally, we simulate a model that includes both social exposure and
IEB decisions. For this combined model, we use the versions of social exposure and IEB intended to
produced the most skewed distributions: social exposure when sharing the largest communities and
joining and exit determined by the IEB formulas when using a quadratic projection of community
size.
3.2 Empirical validation
e sizes of subreddits on Reddit provide the empirical baseline for our comparison. In order to
construct a sample that matches the scale of our simulations, we used data published by Pushshi
to identify the number of active members of all 23,663 subreddit communities active in January
2017. We dene an active member as a unique username that has commented at least ve times
during the period of data collection. Because the communities in our sample can only have up to
9,000 members, we truncate the plots at that point. is excludes the size data of 29 subreddits
which had more than 9,000 members.
We analyze the results of our agent-based simulations through visual comparison of the distribu-
tions of community size generated by the simulations and those observed in a sample of online
communities. We present complementary empirical cumulative distribution functions (eCDFs) to
visualize data from our simulations and from real communities. e community size is shown
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along the x-axis. e proportion of communities at least as large as any given value along the
x-axis are shown along the y-axis. Due to the skew of the data, we log both axes. We elaborate on
the empirical sample, eCDFs, and the rationale for our comparisons below.
We inspect our plots to evaluate whether our simulations generate heavy tails reecting the
large number of very large communities found empirically. Such distributions appear as a straight
or nearly straight diagonal line on our plots. In contrast, normal (Gaussian) distributions deviate
quickly and sharply away from the diagonal. Our analysis considers whether the simulated eCDF
generated by the dierent models produce straight lines as well as how well they align with the
eCDF from Reddit.
For the dierent families of simulations, we present the results as grids of plots. Each cell of
these grids corresponds to a single permutation of the possible parameter values described above;
the permuted parameter names and values appear above and to the right of each grid. Every plot
includes the community size eCDF produced by the corresponding simulation in blue as well as the
community size eCDF from our sample of subreddits in red-orange. e x-axis and y-axis labels
for the plots appear along the boom and to the le of each grid. Each curve starts at the top of
the y-axis at the point corresponding to the smallest community and reaches 0 at the size of the
largest community at the corresponding point on the x-axis. e eCDF produced by the subreddit
communities is identical in every sub-plot of every gure and dierences in appearance results
from shis in the scaling of axes and aspect ratios.
Interpretation of our results rests on identifying qualitative similarities between the eCDF from
Reddit and the eCDFs from our simulations. While quantitative procedures and statistical tests
for comparing CDFs exist, our goal is not to simulate a process that can generate the precise
distributions from Reddit. Rather, our goal is to simulate theoretical models of community joining
and evaluate if they can generate a distribution of community sizes with characteristics that are
qualitatively similar to those observed in reality. For each simulation, we ask whether community
members’ collective behavior traces a fairly straight diagonal line across the range of the log-log
eCDF plot. is shape means that a considerable number of both large and small communities
exist.
4 RESULTS
Overall, we nd that only a synthesis of social exposure and IEB decisions produce community
size distributions that broadly resemble empirically observed paerns of behavior. e null model
fails to produce realistic distributions of community sizes. Our simulations of agents using either
individual expected benets-based decisions or social exposure rules alone do beer than the null
model but produce either too few large communities or too few small communities to reproduce
empirical paerns. We explain each set of results in more detail below.
4.1 Null models
Figure 3 shows a grid of eCDF plots of community sizes for the null model simulations which
incorporate random exposure and random joining and exit decisions. e grid of plots show how
the simulated eCDF changes with varying joining probability (increasing from le-to-right) and
exposure probability (increasing from top-to-boom).
e simulated eCDFs (in blue) do not produce straight diagonal lines nor do they align with
the empirical eCDFs produced by subreddit communities. Starting in the top le of the grid,
the simulation with the lowest probabilities of random joining and exit decisions and of random
exposure mainly generates small communities. Towards the boom right of the grid, the joining
and exit decision and exposure probabilities get higher and lead to uniformly larger communities.
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Fig. 3. Null models with random exposure and random decisions to join. Moving from from le to right
across the grid, each column reflects an increasing probability that agents will join a community they are
exposed to. Rows reflect increasing probability of exposure from top to boom. Each sub-plot visualizes
eCDFs, where the x-axis is the proportion of all contributors that are in a given community and the y-axis is
the number of communities at least that large.
Nearly all of the simulated eCDFs assume a vertical appearance at some point along the community
size distribution (x-axis). In the context of a log-log CDF plot, this paern is characteristic of more
bell-shaped (normal) distributions with relatively low variance.
When the probability of exposure and joining and exit decisions are low, the distribution is
slightly skewed. At higher probabilities, it is bell-shaped. e overall similarity of these results
across the grid suggests that none of the parameters in the ranges we include have a strong direct
eect on the skew of community sizes.
4.2 Social exposure models
Figure 4 plots the results from simulations of individual-level social exposure to new communities
along with random joining and exit xed at .1 and .56, respectively.2 In this grid, the number of
communities shared per neighbor increases over the columns from le to right. e two rows
contain versions of the models where agents share randomly selected communities (top) and the
biggest communities (boom). e top row suggests that social exposure when agents share a
random set of communities generates a distribution of communities of similar sizes rather than a
range of large and small communities. is occurs no maer how many communities each neighbor
shares—even as the size of communities grows as the number of shared communities increases.
We nd that models in which agents share only the largest communities to which they belong
(the boom row of Figure 4) produce more realistic distributions of community size. As the number
2e appendix includes results from a model with joining set at .05.
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Fig. 4. Social exposure models. Complementary eCDF plots showing when agents are exposed to communities
via others in their current communities. Moving from le to right, the number of communities that each
“neighbor” shares increases. Upper plots show when agents share a random set of communities, lower plots
show when they share the largest communities to which they belong.
of communities shared per neighbor increases (looking le-to-right across the row) the simulated
eCDF shis closer to the diagonal and the eCDF from Reddit. However, substantial deviations
remain even in the boom right plots that oer the best t. ese simulations produce too few
small communities and too few large communities to line up more closely with the empirical data.
Visually, this is why the simulated eCDFs in this boom row start out above the eCDF from Reddit
and then cross below it at some point along the X-axis.
4.3 IEB models
Figure 5 shows results of simulations with agents that make joining and exit decisions based on
individual expected benets aer being exposed to a random subset of communities. e rows
of the grid vary the proportion of communities from the exposure set that each agent joins. e
columns vary the value of the random exposure probability (pe ). As with the null models and
the social exposure models, none of the IEB models produce results that align with the empirical
baseline across the full range of the eCDFs.
e IEB models generate beer ts to the empirical data than either the null models or social
exposure models. e best ts in the grid appear along the le column and towards the top row. is
suggests that agents making IEB decisions and joining a small proportion of the largest communities
they are randomly exposed to produces the most realistic distribution of community sizes. However,
the simulated results remain consistently less skewed than the empirical data at the high end of the
community size range. e single best ing simulated CDF in Figure 5 (in the top-le) tracks the
eCDF very closely across most of the community size range, and then falls o. is illustrates that
the IEB decision models also fail to generate a sucient number of the very largest communities.
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Fig. 5. IEB models. Complementary eCDFs of community size when agents are exposed to a random set of
communities and choose based on IEB. Moving from le to right, the proportion of communities that agents
join increases. From top to boom, the probability of random exposure increases.
e second IEB model, in which agents t a quadratic rather than a linear equation, produced
nearly identical results. A gure showing these results is included in the Appendix.
4.4 Combined models: Social exposure plus IEB
e combined models incorporate the two sub-processes of community joining and exit considered
separately above. Figure 6 shows the results of these models across a range of parameters for each
of the sub-processes. In terms of social exposure, the plots in the grid show agents that share
an increasing number of communities with their neighbors, from le to right. In terms of IEB
decisions, the plots display agents that join an increasing proportion of communities from their
exposure set, from top to boom.
As before, none of the plots in this grid show perfect alignment between the simulated and
empirical data across the full range of both the x and y axes. In general, the deviations once
again emerge at the upper end of the community size distribution, indicating that even both social
exposure and IEB decisions combined fail to generate a sucient number of the very largest
communities within the framework of our simulations. However, several of these plots align much
more closely than any of the others we have presented thus far and many of them appear as straight
or nearly straight lines. In particular, the simulation data ploed in the top le cell and the plots in
the right three cells of the middle row line up closely with the eCDF right up until the very upper
end of the community size distribution. Other cells along the top row also show good alignment.
e additive eects of the two sub-processes likely explains the improved t we observe among
several of the combined models. e fact that the improved t recurs across multiple parameter
values suggests that the improvements come from the features of the model rather than any
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January .
How individual behaviors drive inequality in online community sizes 1:15
1 2 3 4
0.05
0.1
0.2
1 10 10
0
10
00 1 10 10
0
10
00 1 10 10
0
10
00 1 10 10
0
10
00
1.000
0.100
0.010
0.001
1.000
0.100
0.010
0.001
1.000
0.100
0.010
0.001
Number of people in community
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 c
om
m
un
itie
s 
≥ x
Reddit Simulations
Number of communities shared by each neighbor
Proportion of considered com
m
unities chosen
Fig. 6. Combined model. Community sizes when agents are exposed to new communities via social exposure
and make participation decisions based on IEB. Moving from le to right, the number of communities that
each “neighbor” shares increases. Moving from top to boom, the proportion of the considered communities
that an agent chooses to join or remain in increases.
particular parameter value on its own. In the appendix, we show the results of a robustness test
with lower exposure probabilities and nd similar results.
5 DISCUSSION
Our simulations suggest that the combination of social exposure and IEB—two mechanisms of
community joining and exit identied in previous research—produce realistic distributions of com-
munity size. Simulations based on social exposure or IEB alone result in right-skewed community
sizes but do not generate extremely large communities. A combined model produces community
sizes that more closely resemble the entire range of empirical community sizes. ese ndings
extend prior research by providing evidence of this joint relationship. e ABS results also illumi-
nate aspects of the relationships between the levels of individual and collective behavior that prior
research had not considered.
A few ndings bear further comment. First, when we model agents exposed randomly to
communities, no decision process produces enough really large communities. Random exposure
cannot explain empirical distributions of community size in the absence of a plausible mechanism
of exposure to a much larger proportion of communities. Mechanisms that make exposure to
larger communities more likely than exposure to smaller ones are required to produce extremely
large communities. Social exposure provides a compelling mechanism that does this and has prior
empirical and theoretical support.
However, even the eect of social exposure depends on which communities agents share. When
agents share communities randomly, social exposure also has lile impact on the distribution of
community sizes. e rst set of social exposure simulations suggest that when people belong to
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only a few communities and share randomly, no community gets large enough to benet from the
feedback mechanism introduced by social exposure. Our second set of social exposure simulations
uses information about paerns in community size to modify our initial model so that agents
choose to share the largest communities to which they belong. Only then does social exposure lead
to skewed community sizes. is suggests an extension to our understanding of social exposure:
that people are more likely to share large communities. We believe this reects a novel proposition
that should be tested empirically.
at said, this mechanism appears to have some limits. Even when agents only share the largest
communities they belong to, community sizes remain concentrated and very few communities
reach the massive sizes we observe in Reddit. Figure 8 in our appendix shows additional analyses
that suggest that this shortcoming appears even more pronounced when agents are initially exposed
to a smaller proportion of the community space.
Another initially perplexing nding provides a clue as to what may be happening. Although we
might expect the most extreme skew when agents share only a few of the very largest communities
they belong to (thus making them ever larger), the simulations suggest the greatest skew emerges
when agents share many. If we look closely at Figure 4 we see that large communities are always
produced and what improves the t is the production of more moderately large and small commu-
nities. One explanation is that by only sharing one community, people quickly converge on one or
two large communities. When more communities are shared, this includes more medium-sized
communities.
Our nding that neither social exposure nor IEB decisions alone could produce the extent of
cumulative advantage necessary to generate the very largest communities also extends prior work.
On their own, each sub-process provides a plausible social mechanism for cumulative advantage.
Previous studies analyzing social exposure or IEB decisions separately had neither evaluated
directly what kinds of macro-level outcomes they produce nor considered the implications of the
two processes interacting. Similarly, previous studies that identied cumulative advantage as a
mathematical mechanism of observed community size distributions had not evaluated whether or
to what degree specic micro-level behaviors could approximate inequality in the distribution of
individuals across communities. e ABS results we present bridge this divide and advance both
bodies of prior work simultaneously.
Our ndings are far from obvious and the simulations presented might have produced very
dierent results. For example, at the outset of this project, we did not know whether both sub-
processes would be necessary. Nor did we know whether agents who share and join the largest
communities would create a bi-modal distribution where nearly all communities were small and
all agents belonged to a few very large communities. Just because we, the researchers, designed
and manipulated the parameters of the simulated models does not mean we could anticipate or
determine the results.
e reasons that social exposure and IEB decisions produce a good approximation of the full
distribution deserves aention in future research. For example, we expect that clustering may
play an important role in explaining why agents who preferentially share and join the largest
communities nevertheless wind up in many small and medium sized communities. Such a paern
might occur because many communities remain ”unheard of” outside of local networks of agents
who share overlapping communities. is proposition merits further evaluation and might help
explain other dimensions of empirically observed behavior.
In sum, our simulations suggest that social exposure combined with IEB decision-making provide
a reasonable explanation for empirical community size paerns. Our results also indicate that
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there is more to the story, however, and that these processes only explain much of the skew in
community size. Below we discuss other features that future work should consider.
5.1 Limitations
Our approach has several important limitations. e most important is common to all agent-based
simulations. While we chose a set of models that we believe capture the most important aspects of
the real-world social computing system we seek to understand, other reasonable formulations might
lead to dierent outcomes. Guided by theory, we aempted to identify the aspects of the model
most likely to be key sources of variation and to parameterize and test those aspects. Although we
are condent that our models are useful and valid in their current form, we have no doubts that
they can be productively elaborated upon.
ABS, like all scientic modeling, intentionally elides details of the real world systems we seek to
understand. For example, we follow most other ABSs in treating all of the agents and collectives
in our simulations as homogeneous. While our model provides plenty of opportunity for certain
types of heterogeneity to arise, it is obvious that real people are heterogeneous in their resources,
interests, and skills. Similarly, communities have topics which may be of broad or very narrow
interest. Although we chose a more parsimonious approach to modeling that ignores it, we are
condent that this heterogeneity contributes to heterogeneity in community sizes and can explain
some of the remaining skew in participation our models fail to capture. Other aspects of these
systems are also likely to inuence group sizes and are deserving of aention, such as the role
of pseudonymity/anonymity, heterogeneity in costs to contribute, tools for social interaction, or
technological features like recommendation systems or default community memberships.
Finally, our work is limited in that we evaluated our ABSs using only at a single macro-level
behavior (community size) from a single empirical data source (Reddit). Future work should look
at how well these simulations predict additional outcomes and behavioral paerns at meso- and
macro-levels such as clustering in participation networks, heterogeneity in individual participation
rates, or temporal paerns of contribution. Additional studies might also validate or revisit ndings
against multiple empirical baselines to ensure that conclusions do not reect the biases of a single
platform, interface, or time period.
6 CONCLUSION
Two social computing theories of how individuals learn about, join, and leave communities provide
a reasonable explanation for how highly unequal distributions of community sizes arise. ese
results link micro-level models of social exposure and IEB joining and leaving decisions to a distinct
scholarship on population-level distributions of community size. e results also support novel
theoretical extensions of these micro-level models that can be tested empirically.
In practical terms, the results underscore that highly skewed and unequal community sizes need
not result from failures on the part of community leaders or participants. Instead, macro-level
inequalities likely arise through the aggregation of individual tendencies and preferences magnied
by the massive scale of large sites like Reddit and others. e fact that two very simple processes
explain so much about community sizes also suggests that platforms should be cautious when
changing things that could directly impact either what people share or the information visible to
help them make decisions. Designers, community managers, advertisers and others may want to
nudge users towards broader and more equitable community sizes. However, doing so may require
fundamentally transforming the ways that individuals learn about or decide to participate in their
communities.
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Micro-macro divides such as the one explored in this study provide many opportunities for
future social computing research. eoretically-grounded ABS combined with empirical validation
provides an ideally-suited approach to advancing these inquiries. We hope others will extend and
evaluate the results presented here, both directly through modeling other macro-level aspects
of online communities, and through using agent-based simulations to bridge other micro-macro
divides to contribute to our understanding of social computing systems.
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APPENDIX A: IEB MODELWITH QUADRATIC PROJECTION
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Fig. 7. IEB model with quadratic projection. Results when agents are exposed to a random set of communities
and use IEB to decide which to join or leave. In these simulations, agents use a quadratic equation to estimate
future community size.
Figure 7 shows the results of a set of simulations where exposure is random and joining and
leaving decisions are made based on the IEB equations. e results are nearly identical to Figure 5,
suggesting that people were already joining the largest projects.
APPENDIX B: ROBUSTNESS CHECK RESULTS
B.1 Social Exposure and Random Joining
Figure 8 shows that when people are less likely to join new communities, nearly all of the skew of
community size disappears, suggesting that the inuence of social exposure by itself is fragile.
B.2 Combined Model
On the other hand, Figure 9 shows that varying the initial proportion of communities that people
are exposed to has very lile eect on the overall shape of the eventual outcomes.
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Fig. 8. Community sizes when people are exposed to new communities via people in their current communities
sharing the largest communities to which they belong. Moving from le to right, the number of communities
that each “neighbor” shares increases. On the top neighbors share random communities. On the boom they
share the biggest to which they belong.
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Fig. 9. Combined model with the initial probability of exposure set to .05. Community sizes when agents are
exposed to new communities via social exposure and make participation decisions based on IEB. Moving
from le to right, the number of communities that each “neighbor” shares increases. Moving from top to
boom, the proportion of the considered communities that an agent chooses to join or remain in increases.
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